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Abstract 
 
This article examines the various roles that indicators, as boundary objects, can play as a 
science-based evidence for policy processes. It presents two case studies from the EU-funded 
POINT project that examined the use and influence of two highly different types of 
indicators: composite indicators of sustainable development at the EU level and energy 
indicators in the UK. In both cases indicators failed as direct input to policy making, yet they 
generated various types of conceptual and political use and influence. The composite 
sustainable development indicators served as “framework indicators”, helping to advocate a 
specific vision of sustainable development, whereas the energy indicators produced various 
types of indirect influence, including through the process of indicator elaboration. Our case 
studies demonstrate the relatively limited importance of the characteristics and quality of 
indicators in determining the role of indicators, as compared with the crucial importance of 
“user factors” (characteristics of policy actors) and “policy factors” (policy context). 
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Introduction 
 
The past couple of decades have seen a multiplication of environmental and sustainability 
indicators designed to improve the evidence base for policy-making and to bridge the 
perceived gap between analysis and action—between science and policy. However, it is 
uncertain to what extent indicators have actually delivered on this promise. Indicator 
producers are often frustrated at what they see as scarce, erroneous, selective, and 
opportunistic use of indicators by policy makers (e.g., Grupp and Schubert 2010). Yet, 
intended indicator users continue to call for the development of more and better indicators. 
While a simplification of the complex processes of coproduction between science and policy 
(Jasanoff 1987), the perception of a “gap” between science and policy is illustrative inasmuch 
as it highlights two alternative approaches to improving indicator work at the science-policy 
interface: producing new—supposedly better—indicators, or enhancing the uptake and 
integration of existing indicators in the policy process. 
Research in this area has overwhelmingly concentrated on the former objective of 
developing new indicators and improving the technical quality of the existing ones (e.g., Ritz 
et al. 2009). Even initiatives entailing, for example, participatory “end-user validation” of 
indicator quality (Meul et al. 2009) have given little attention to the fate of indicators in 
policy-making and their role as evidence. Hence, we still know little about how and why 
policy makers, stakeholders, and citizens use indicators and, more importantly, whether and 
in which ways indicators actually influence policy and society. 
The European Union (EU)–funded research project POINT (Policy Influence of 
Indicators)
1
 examined the roles that environmental and sustainability indicators play (or 
indeed, fail to play) in policy making in different countries, in different sectors, and at 
various levels of governance. In contrast with the dominant rationalistic approaches to the 
analysis of indicators, the project sought to examine the various indirect ways in which 
indicators exert their influence. This article presents two of the POINT case studies—the 
composite indicators of sustainable development (SDI-Cs) in the EU and the UK Energy 
Sector Indicators (ESIs). Composite indicators typically aggregate diverse types of 
information in order to facilitate communication to various publics and to compare 
performance across policies, sectors, or countries. Sectoral indicators are usually targeted at a 
specific set of policy makers and designed to monitor progress in an individual sector. 
The article is structured as follows. After this introduction, the second section 
presents the theoretical framework for analyzing the roles of indicators in policy making, 
distinguishing between the concepts of “use” and “influence” of indicators, and outlining a 
series of factors that can help to explain these roles. The third section applies this framework 
for analyzing our two case studies. The last section compares the cases and discusses our 
results in the light of generic patterns of indicator use and influence. 
 
The Framework 
 
Indicators as Boundary Objects 
 
Indicators have been defined as “variables that summarise or otherwise simplify relevant 
information, make visible or perceptible phenomena of interest, and quantify, measure, and 
communicate relevant information” (Gallopin 1996: 108). The underlying assumption is that 
of “indication”, that is, assessing a phenomenon that is not directly measurable (e.g., 
biodiversity or sustainability) through a limited set of measurable parameters (Turnhout 
2009: 403). Unlike many other knowledge types, notably data and statistics, indicators are 
based on an underlying conceptual framework, which anchors indicators in theory, 
establishes a logic to the selection of indicators, and provides the supporting technical 
definitions, metrics, and linkages, thereby situating an individual indicator within a broader 
network of information (Gudmundsson 2003: 4; Pintér et al. 2005: 16). Often indicators are 
also based on a utilization framework that defines the intended functions of the indicators—
for example, information, monitoring, or control (Gudmundsson 2003: 4). As a way of 
operationalizing the concept of evidence-based policy, indicators are expected to serve 
multiple functions, in particular communication and awareness raising, monitoring and 
evaluation of performance, early warning, political advocacy, control and accountability, and 
improved quality of decisions. Whichever the primary objective, indicators are expected to 
simplify and facilitate communication by reducing ambiguity (Hardi and Zdan 1997; McCool 
and Stankey 2004: 295). 
These expectations of indicator functions are habitually rooted in a rationalistic and 
linear conception of the instrumental role of science-based knowledge in policy making, 
entailing the assumption that more efficient and rational policy processes will automatically 
follow as robust, data-driven, objective, and value-free evidence is made available for policy 
makers in a simplified, synthesized format, translated into policy makers’ language.
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 The 
underlying logic is one of better information (because both robust and simple) for better 
decisions (because effective and efficient). The linear model still prevails as the main 
narrative in policy practice (Owens et al. 2004; Adelle et al. 2012), even though research on 
knowledge use (e.g., Vedung 1997; Weiss 1977; 1999) has repeatedly demonstrated that 
knowledge seldom plays such a straightforward role in policy making, but far more often 
interacts with policies through indirect and largely unforeseen pathways, for instance, by 
gradually shaping frameworks of thought or by serving as ammunition in political battles. 
As a form of evidence, indicators have been conceptualized as boundary objects 
(Jasanoff 1987; Turnhout 2009), potentially able to mediate between different categories of 
policy actors, or “social worlds” (Star 2010), such as—to simplify—science, policy, and 
society (Bauler 2012). While boundaries serve essential functions (Bauler 2012: 42), they 
become dysfunctional when they develop into knowledge gaps, notably between science and 
policy, that is, “analysis” and “action”. Each category of policy actors relies on its own mode 
of organization, norms, conventions, and habitus in terms of information production and use. 
As a specific form of translated, synthesized, conventionalized information, indicators can 
help to bridge the boundaries between different types of policy actors (Turnhout 2009: 403). 
The potential effectiveness of indicators as “boundary objects” in connecting science 
and policy stems from their flexibility, ambiguity, and even vagueness, which allows them 
“to have meaning in both social worlds, and stable enough to travel back and forth between 
them” (Turnhout 2009: 405). Such flexibility entails the perception of indicators 
simultaneously as objective, exact, and scientifically robust information and as partly 
subjective, directly policy-relevant, and tailor-made evidence. Hence, a boundary object can 
be tailored to local disciplinary work within a single community or “social world”, but it can 
nevertheless retain a common identity across settings (ibid.). Boundary objects allow groups 
to work together without consensus, in a continuous process of tacking back and forth 
between the vague and the more tailor-made forms of the object (Star 2010: 604–605). 
As Star (ibid.: 613–614) notes, “people (often administrators or regulatory agencies) 
try to control the tacking back-and-forth, and especially, to standardize and make equivalent 
the ill-structured and well-structured aspects of the particular boundary object.” The 
institutionalization of an indicator often entails the appropriation of both the calculus and 
publication of the indicator by administrations (typically by statistical offices). In such 
processes, indicators cease to operate as boundary objects, hence potentially generating new 
residual categories, communities of practice of “others” or “outsiders” (ibid.: 615), which do 
not fit within the established institutionalized and standardized frame. 
Whether indicators actually fulfill their potential as boundary objects is an empirical 
question, and depends on the interplay between the social worlds that the indicator is 
designed to connect. This article will examine boundary work in two different case study 
contexts. The starting hypothesis for our analysis was that the shape of this boundary work 
exhibits notable similarities across different policy contexts and across types of indicators. 
The next section presents the framework used for examining the use and influence of 
indicators at the interface between policy and science. The framework first distinguishes 
between the different types of use and influence of indicators in policy processes, and then 
identifies the factors that help to explain and understand such use and influence. 
 Distinguishing Between the “Use” and “Influence” of Indicators 
 
We distinguish between the “use” and the “influence” of indicators. The distinction is 
grounded in a series of attempts (e.g., Knott and Wildavsky 1980; Rich and Oh 2000; Henry 
and Mark 2003; Boulanger 2007) to describe the interactions between information and policy 
as an “information pathway” comprising a set of stages (e.g., the existence, accessibility, 
collection, uptake, digestion, use, influence, impact, and discard of information). We chose to 
simplify the analysis by reducing the stages to two: indicator use by various governmental 
and nongovernmental policy actors in the two social worlds of “science” and “policy”; and 
indicator influence during the policy processes. 
“Use” denotes the concrete act of handling the indicators in a policy context, whereas 
“influence” refers to the impact on policy processes at any moment in the indicator 
production and utilization chain. Indicator influence occurs through dialogue and 
argumentation (Valovirta 2002), either through “process use” (Patton 1998; Forss et al. 
2002)—that is, social learning, networking, and increased focus and motivation among policy 
actors involved in indicator development (Mickwitz and Melanen 2009)—or as a 
consequence of the release of the final indicator or indicator set. While “use” traces back the 
objectives, intentions, and strategies pursued by actors handling the indicator (including those 
developing the indicator), “influence” reflects the ways in which indicators interact with 
policy-making.
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Indicator influence can concern the targeted policy or broader processes in society, 
such as the operation and shape of administrative structures and democratic institutions. It 
can entail new or reconfirmed decisions and actions, shared understandings, networking 
among policy actors, or changes in the legitimacy of policy actors (Valovirta 2002; Henry 
and Mark 2003; Lehtonen 2005). However, both indicator use and influence may differ from 
what was expected. Indicators might be designed, for instance, to monitor the evolution of a 
particular variable (say, the share of wind power in electricity generation) aimed at measuring 
policy performance (in promoting the production of renewable energy). Yet, the publication 
and use of wind energy indicators might fuel discussion on the desirability and harmful 
effects of wind parks, an outcome potentially at odds with the objectives of the wind power 
advocates. 
We distinguish three types of indicator use and influence: instrumental, conceptual, 
and political. While instrumental use and influence entail indicators as direct input to policy 
making, conceptual use and influence occur when indicators help to constitute a broad 
information base for decisions by shaping conceptual frameworks, mostly through dialogue, 
public debate, and argumentation, thus resulting in “enlightenment” (Weiss 1999).
4
 
Indicators can also generate overtly political use and influence. This can entail 
symbolic use and influence, where knowledge creation is a substitute for action or a delaying 
tactic (Vedung 1997; Ortega-Cerdà 2005). Indicators can serve as “strong justification” 
(Stirling 2006) by helping to justify predetermined positions and to persuade various actors 
about the qualities of policy plans that are already well on their way toward implementation 
(Hezri and Dovers 2006). Some types of indicator use have been framed as “misuse”, 
involving, for instance, distortion or omission of significant elements (Grupp and Schubert 
2010: 76). However, in the form of “weak justification” (Sitrling 2006), this type of political 
use and influence can also constitute an essential source of democratic legitimacy, or a form 
of advocacy for socially progressive objectives such as sustainable development (Parris and 
Kates 2003). Terms such as “misuse” and “shared concepts” are not neutral, and beg the 
question of who is to determine what counts as “misuse” and who defines the “shared 
concepts”. 
The perspective drawing a distinction between use and influence as described above 
partly calls into question Turnhout’s (2009) claim that to be effective as boundary objects, 
indicators must rely on classifications that have become “invisible” and unquestioned. If the 
shape and framing of indicators are contested, indicators would be rejected and thereby fail to 
fulfill their function as boundary objects. However, this conceptualization seems to downplay 
those forms of political and conceptual influence that stem from disagreement, 
argumentation, contestation, and even protest. Controversies over, for instance, the proper 
definitions of indicators may not promote policy consensus, but they can crucially shape the 
perceptions and identities of the actors involved. The use of consensual indicators may 
indeed strengthen the prevailing framings and status quo rather than trigger change. 
Conversely, even when an indicator or an indicator set is not actively used, the classifications 
and framings embodied in the indicator system often exert significant influence. 
 
Factors That Help to Explain the Use and Influence of Indicators 
 
The second part of our analytical framework consists of the factors that could help explain 
patterns of use and influence. We build on Pregernig’s (2000) typology of three factors 
governing knowledge uptake: the information itself (indicator factors), the knowledge and 
experience of the receiver (user factors), and the external settings (policy factors). 
Indicator factors include the quality
5
 of the indicators. User factors consist of the 
“repertoires” of the actors involved in indicator production and use.
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 At the individual level, 
repertoires can be conceptualized as “stabilised ways of thinking and acting” (van der Meer 
1999: 390) governing, for instance, the individual choices among the information available 
and the ways in which an actor positions him- or herself in relation to an indicator or 
indicator development process (Hezri and Dovers 2006). At the collective level, repertoires 
relate to the “stabilised codes, operations and technology” (van der Meer 1999: 390)—in our 
case, for instance, the degree to which the use and production of indicators is part of an 
organization’s operational routines. Particularly crucial is the match between the implicit or 
explicit conceptual model underpinning an indicator and the repertoires of the users involved 
(Turnhout 2009): to what extent does the framing of reality inherent in an indicator 
correspond with the framings held by the policy actors? Policy factors denote the 
“metasetting” within which indicators are produced and used. These include the long-term 
framework conditions, the short-term shifts in governing coalitions, and the characteristics of 
the policy issues at stake (Sabatier 1987). 
Indicator, user, and policy factors are interdependent and partly overlapping. Their 
meaning varies according to the place in which an actor situates him- or herself along the 
continuum between the two opposite framings, described by Rametsteiner et al. (2011) as the 
“knowledge-production” and the “norm-creation” perspectives. The former emphasizes the 
search for scientific, technical, objective knowledge—and, by implication, portrays indicators 
as objective data—while the politically driven “norm-creation” perspective stresses the 
balancing of norms, values, and interests in indicator work. The former framing would place 
indicator factors at the heart of the analysis, whereas the latter would emphasize the policy 
factors. According to Rametsteiner et al., both perspectives often downplay the normative 
dimension of indicator development: the science-driven perspective adheres to a strict 
separation of science and policy, while the norm-creation approach tends to forget the 
normative aspects involved in knowledge creation (ibid.: 62). 
Combining the two categorizations results in a simple matrix describing the ways in 
which the three factors combine to shape the degree to which an indicator is used and 
influences policy instrumentally, conceptually, or politically. The matrix in table 1 should be 
read in the first instance by its columns: once a particular type of use or influence—or its 
absence—has been identified in a given policy situation, explanations can be sought at the 
three levels of indicator, user, and policy factors described above.  
 
 Use and Influence 
 Instrumental Conceptual Political 
Indicator factors    
User factors    
Policy factors    
Table 1: Theoretical framework. 
 
Table 2 presents the two highly different sets of indicators that we examined in our 
case studies. The EU SDI-Cs are highly aggregated, inherently cross-sectoral, and aimed at 
awareness raising and communication. The UK ESIs, in turn, are far more disaggregated, 
limited to one sector, and aimed mainly at monitoring progress. 
 
Composite indicators for sustainable 
development (SDI-C) 
UK Energy Sector Indicators (ESIs) 
Social sphere: main focus of analysis on the 
Human Development Index, less detailed 
analysis of Happy Planet Index, Worldwide 
Governance Indicator, and Human Well-
Being Index. 
Environmental sphere: main focus on 
Ecological Footprint, less detailed analysis of 
Living Planet Index, Ecosystems Well-being 
Index, and Environmental Performance 
Index. 
Economic sphere: main focus on Genuine 
Four headline indicators: 
1. Low carbon: Greenhouse gas and 
carbon dioxide emissions 
2. Reliability: Gas and electricity 
capacity margins - maximum supply 
and maximum demand 
3. Competitiveness: Overall 
competitiveness score for selected EU 
energy markets 
4. Fuel Poverty: Number of households 
in fuel poverty 
28 supporting indicators (see annex A). 
Savings, less detailed analysis of Index of 
Sustainable Economic Welfare, Corruption 
Perception Index, and Gini Index. 
About 140 background indicators, grouped 
under five headings. 
Table 2: Presentation of the two sets of indicators. 
 
The Types of Use and Influence of Composite and Sectoral Indicators 
 
This section summarizes the results of our analysis of the role of composite sustainability 
indicators at the EU level and the Energy Sector Indicators in the UK. 
 
Composite Sustainable Development Indicators (SDI-Cs) in EU-Level Policy Making 
 
Our first case study investigated the use and influence of composite sustainable development 
indicators (SDI-Cs) by institutionalized actors at the EU level. The empirical material was 
gathered via semistructured interviews,
7
 participation in indicator workshops and 
conferences,
8
 and the analysis of sustainability-related EU policy documents.
9
 Twelve SDI-
Cs were examined, each classified under environmental, social, or economic pillars of 
sustainable development (see table 2). 
 
Absence of Instrumental Use: Lack of Demand or Mismatch between Supply and Demand?  
 
In contrast with earlier literature, which attributes the multiplication of indicators to an 
increasing demand for tools to inform policy analysis (e.g., Rosenström 2002; Gudmundsson 
2003), our findings showed weak or missing demand for SDI-Cs, and as a result, lack of 
instrumental use (Sébastien and Bauler 2013). Decision makers expressed a need for SDI-Cs 
to obtain a quick overview of sustainability and insight into current debates, to get an idea of 
what is measurable and what is not, and to enable comparisons. Yet, these same individuals 
suggested that the overwhelming number of composite indicators currently available would 
aggravate the problem of ambiguity. A number of factors can explain this discrepancy 
between “demand” and “supply”. 
First, most of our EU-level informants had a poor knowledge of the analyzed SDI-Cs. 
They generally were only aware of the Ecological Footprint and the Human Development 
Index, and often argued that they were not specialists of sustainable development. They did 
not feel directly concerned by sustainability indicators, which are generally designed for both 
policy makers and the society at large, and whose functions were seen as unclear and 
ambiguous due to their double role as decision-making aids and tools for advocating 
alternative worldviews. Our informants considered disaggregated indicators as more useful 
and influential than SDI-Cs. Also, the communication of SDI-Cs was seemingly not tailored 
to the needs of EU-level policy actors. Our informants argued that due to the inherent 
subjectivity of SDI-Cs—in combination with the complexity and the nature of sustainable 
development as a poorly defined policy area—practically every step in these indicators’ 
production and diffusion would be “arbitrary”.
10
 
 
Conceptual Influence: SDI-Cs as “Framing Indicators” 
 
If SDI-Cs are not used instrumentally, they nevertheless appear to exert indirect, conceptual 
influence. SDI-Cs are “framing indicators” that shape visions and frameworks of thought, 
mobilize action, and generate awareness and symbolic images (Weiss 1999; Amara et al. 
2004), thereby possibly influencing future decisions. SDI-Cs can provide a conceptual 
framework, open for interpretation and application, that helps to organize diagnostic and 
prescriptive inquiry, form a “meta-theoretical language” enabling comparison between 
theories, and engender collective understanding of sustainability (Sonntag 2010). In this 
sense, SDI-Cs are theory-driven and have a strong conceptual element, allowing discussion 
on new paradigms rather than providing unambiguous and targeted policy advice. SDI-Cs 
were also used politically as ammunition in the efforts of policy actors to legitimize their 
positions, worldviews, and visions of sustainability. 
 
Explaining the Lack of Direct Use and Influence 
 
Policy factors were central in explaining the use and nonuse of the SDI-Cs. The failure of 
sustainable development to become an overarching reference point in EU-level policy 
making, the sheer breadth of sustainable development as a policy area, and the emergence of 
well-being and the associated indicators (WBIs) as a new master frame replacing sustainable 
development were believed to compromise the take-up of SDI-Cs.
11
 
In terms of institutionalization (Beyer and Trice 1982), our findings suggest that 
WBIs are in the societal “adoption phase”, generating “affective reactions” (including 
discussions about their role within society), whereas SDI-Cs would be at the more advanced 
“implementation phase”, generating instead “receptive reactions” (i.e., discussions about how 
well messages are being understood and appropriated by different actors). WBIs engender 
interest, surprise, and dialogue among the interviewed policy actors, whereas SDI-Cs tend to 
generate conflict among producers and actors about their potential use. Many of our 
interviewees were disillusioned by SDI-Cs, and placed their hopes on WBIs as a framework 
that could be more instrumental for change. 
The lack of coordination and harmonization across the various EU institutions in 
sustainable development–related indicator work further helps to explain the modest degree of 
use and influence of composites. The EU sustainability policy appears to rely on different 
indicator sets based on contradicting conceptualizations of sustainable development proposed 
by different EU bodies,
12
 and characterized by multiple separate but overlapping policy 
streams and frameworks (Saltelli et al. 2010). Some of our informants argued that this would 
not be a problem as such, since decision makers are free to choose those indicators that best 
suit the policy objectives of the moment. In principle, by evoking different paradigms, SDI-
Cs could nevertheless shake up stabilized codes and repertoires and open up new ways of 
representing reality. 
The influence of SDI-Cs seemed to be conditioned by negotiations among a limited 
number of privileged interest groups promoting rival worldviews. For example, according to 
some interviewees, some actors oppose the Ecological Footprint for fear of the radical change 
of policies that the indicator would call for. In the terminology of Turnhout (2009), the 
Ecological Footprint indicator therefore failed as a boundary object largely because of an 
excessive distance between the underlying values and preferences between the different 
“social worlds” that the indicator was deemed to connect. 
The perceived poor legitimacy of the producers of the SDI-Cs further reduced their 
influence. Many of the traditional composite indicators (including gross domestic product) 
were designed by experts upon specific demand from decision makers. By contrast, SDI-Cs 
are typically proposed “upward” to decision makers and “downward” to society at large by a 
variety of “midlevel” actors such as nongovernmental organizations and think tanks; SDI-Cs 
could therefore be labelled middle-up and middle-down indicators (Sébastien and Bauler 
2010). However, as intermediaries between civil society and the political/institutional sphere, 
these organizations are not perceived as legitimate enough to impose their indicators in the 
public and political arenas. 
Finally, in comparison with policy and user factors, indicator factors explained little 
of the indicator use and influence. Some methodologically robust SDI-Cs remain widely 
unused, while other indicators, often acknowledged to be of poorer quality, have been 
adopted because they generate little conflict. A greater conceptual robustness and precision 
hence tended in fact to reduce the ability of some indicators to operate as a boundary object. 
Table 3 summarizes our results according to our framework and highlights the main 
types of use and influence. 
 
 Instrumental Conceptual Political 
Indicator factors 
Demand for SDI-Cs 
unspecified 
Indicator quality of 
minor importance  
Divergent policy 
requirements 
regarding data within 
EU 
User factors 
Low awareness of 
SDI-Cs among 
policymakers 
Unclear target groups 
(policymakers and 
society) 
Fundamental 
normative 
disagreements 
concerning visions 
and worldviews 
Lack of legitimacy 
and trust in mid-level 
actors that produce 
indicators 
Policy factors 
Lack of 
harmonisation of 
indicator work across 
EU bodies 
Rising well-being 
discourse and decline 
of SD as the 
overarching 
normative reference 
Rising well-being 
discourse and decline 
of SD  
Multiplicity of policy 
streams within EU 
Table 3: Summary of factors explaining the use and influence of SDI-Cs at the EU level. 
 
 
 
 
Energy Sector Indicators in the UK 
 
Our second case study analyzed the role of the UK Energy Sector Indicators (ESIs) 
introduced in 2003 to help follow the progress toward the four overarching policy goals set 
out in the government’s energy white paper (DTI 2003): tackling climate change, ensuring 
the reliability of energy supply, fostering competitive energy markets, and eradicating fuel 
poverty. The set consisted of one headline indicator for each of the four goals; 28 supporting 
indicators (11 relevant to the climate goal, seven to energy security, five to competitiveness, 
and five to fuel poverty; see appendix A); and 140 background indicators. The case study was 
based on the analysis of government documents relating to the ESIs; semistructured 
interviews with 15 experts, stakeholders, and civil servants from the energy sector; 
participant observation in a stakeholder workshop on energy sector indicators organized as 
part of the research project; and an analysis of the treatment of indicators in the UK national 
press. 
 
Absence of Instrumental Use: Does Anybody Want Energy Indicators? 
 
The initial aim of the case study was to examine the extent to which the ESIs had contributed 
to the observed shift in (1) the priorities in energy policy in favor of energy security and to 
the detriment of climate change mitigation and (2) the policy style, which again returned to 
the earlier authoritarianism after a brief interlude of participatory policy making in the early 
2000s (MacKerron 2009). However, this research objective had to be abandoned as evidence 
about the very modest role of these indicators in UK energy policy began to accumulate. The 
ESIs can, indeed, be considered as a prime example of nonuse of indicators. The UK 
department responsible for energy policy
13
 published these indicators in its annual reports on 
the implementation of the white paper’s conclusions and recommendations. However, not 
only were even many energy policy insiders unaware of the existence of the ESIs, but a clear 
target group of indicator users seemed not to have been identified prior to the introduction of 
the indicator set. According to the civil servants responsible for the ESIs, these indicators 
were produced because the Department of Energy had a legal obligation to do so. As in the 
case of the SDI-Cs, these indicators were essentially supply-driven. 
The origin of the ESIs can ultimately be traced back to the evidence-based policy 
agenda introduced by the New Labour government in 1997. Many interviewees evoked the 
need to strengthen the government’s accountability toward the public as the main function of 
the ESIs. However, energy indicators in general and ESIs in particular are not prominent 
among the types of evidence underpinning policy making in the UK energy sector. Time and 
again the interviewed energy sector authorities underlined that indicators were only a minor 
part of the broad evidence base used by government officials responsible for energy policy. 
The very limited response rate to our numerous requests for interviews and/or participation in 
our stakeholder workshop further attested to such a lack of interest,
14
 as did the nearly 
complete absence of reference to the ESIs in the national press. The mere notion of indicators 
seemed to have only little resonance in the energy sector, and the interviewees held rather 
ambiguous and partly contradictory views on the nature of indicators. On the one hand, both 
government and private sector informants argued that core evidence for energy policy comes 
from “raw” data, statistics, cost-benefit analyses, and scenarios
15
—not from indicators—yet 
they frequently equated the word indicator with data and statistics, or alternatively 
downplayed the importance of indicators, presumably perceiving them as an inferior and 
excessively subjective form of information. Implicitly, our informants usually adhered to the 
“science-driven” view of indicators as boundary objects (Rametsteiner et al. 2011), and saw 
the involvement of politics in indicator work as undesirable. 
The energy sector authorities have sought to better match the supply with the demand 
for indicators, notably by opening up the indicator producer community to users/stakeholders, 
in response to recommendations by the National Statistics Authority’s recent assessment of 
the ESIs (UKSA 2009). However, despite the explicit request expressed in the 2009 and 2010 
ESI reports, no stakeholder comments and suggestions on the indicator set had been received 
by May 2011, which further indicates the lack of interest in the ESIs. 
 
The Importance of Political Influence: ESIs as “Ammunition” 
 
Despite the scarcity of active use of the ESIs in policy making, the set nevertheless generated 
influence, notably through the processes of indicator design. The cross-departmental Joint 
Energy Security of Supply working group (JESS), established in 2001, was influential in 
framing debates, building consensus, and creating networks among different authorities 
concerned with energy sector policy and indicators. The creation of the JESS group as such 
showed a heightened awareness of energy security challenges within the government. While 
the ESIs clearly did not drive policy, they were used by the government to justify changes in 
policy priorities and measures, notably in favor of energy security. 
The interviewees usually could not identify clear instances of political use of the 
ESIs, but frequently referred to the use of indicators in general (not only the ESIs) by 
different policy protagonists to support their views. Often such use of knowledge to justify 
preestablished positions was portrayed as illegitimate manipulation. To a modest degree, 
ESIs were used as political ammunition. Environmental action groups used the CO2 and fuel 
poverty indicators to criticize the government for its failure to reach its own targets, whereas 
the government used the competitiveness indicator both domestically and internationally to 
promote and legitimize energy market liberalization. 
 
Explaining the Lack of Direct Use and Influence 
 
The most frequently evoked weaknesses in the indicator factors were lack of policy relevance 
and timeliness of the ESIs, including too high a level of aggregation (national instead of 
subnational level), lack of indicators to measure the cost-effectiveness of government 
policies, and long lead times in producing indicators. Instead of the usually backward-looking 
information provided by indicators, forward-looking scenarios and cost calculations were 
considered more useful forms of evidence. High quality of the indicators was not a necessary 
prerequisite for influence: for instance, the technical flaws in the fuel poverty headline 
indicator were recognized by many—including its designers—yet it was identified as among 
the strongest in generating policy debate and action. 
The role of the user factors can best be seen as coupled with the general institutional 
and political context. First, there is an apparent absence of an “indicator culture” within the 
UK energy sector, and many of our informants downplayed the importance of indicators as 
evidence, contrasting indicators with data, scenarios, and cost-benefit analysis. The portrayal 
of indicators as neutral data or “science” on one hand but an inferior and simplified form of 
evidence on the other appeared surprising in view of the evidence-based policy culture and 
rhetoric in the UK (Hood 2007). This may in part result from the dominance of engineers and 
economists in the UK energy sector: in these professional communities, hard data and 
statistics tend to occupy a privileged position as evidence. The long-standing “market 
fundamentalism” characterizing the UK energy policy (Rutledge and Wright 2011), with 
mainstream economics as its dominant analytical framework and statistical “raw” data as its 
preferred form of evidence, probably further undermined the potential of indicators to 
influence policy.
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 The organizational short-termism of the British civil service was also 
evoked, as the quick turnover of civil servants (two to three years at the same post) 
effectively prevents the emergence of “indicator champions” that would actively foster the 
adoption and use of indicators within their organization. 
Especially the government interviewees underlined repeatedly, and without being 
prompted by the interviewer, the neutrality and objectivity of governmental indicators and 
statistics. This can be understood against the background of the widespread mistrust in 
government institutions and especially its use of evidence (Bickerstaff et al. 2008), shaped by 
the country’s analytical yet adversarial policy style (Greenaway et al. 1992: 59). In an 
adversarial policy context the legitimacy of policy arguments depends on the ability of policy 
actors to present persuasive analytical evidence, probably making strategic and political use 
of indicators and statistics more likely than in a more consensual and “holistic” (Gambetta 
1998) policy culture. Furthermore, given the late arrival of the evidence-based movement in 
the UK energy sector, the government officials are probably keen to shed the still-prevailing 
reputation of a sector dominated by strong lobby groups and ideology rather than evidence-
based policy.
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As for the characteristics of the policy issues at stake, some of our informants 
suggested that the rapid changes in climate and energy science and policy quickly render 
indicators obsolete. Moreover, it seems that the “process use” tends to decline as the degree 
of consensus on the issue at hand increases. Fuel poverty and energy security indicators 
probably benefited from the lack of consensus on the terminology: the continuous 
contestation over the definition of fuel poverty throughout the years
18
 can be seen as an 
essential part of “process use”, whereas the increasing priority of energy security on the 
policy agenda probably fuelled discussions among experts on the appropriate definition and 
indicators of energy security. 
Finally, the all-encompassing role of performance measurement systems within the 
UK government contrasted with the weak direct influence from the ESIs, and highlights the 
importance of financial and legal incentives: in the absence of tangible consequences from 
performance measurement on the policy actors, the indicator is unlikely to generate effects. 
Table 4 summarizes the results from the UK case study. 
 
 
Table 4: Summary of factors explaining the use and influence of the UK ESIs. 
 
Discussion: Toward Pathways between Indicator Use and Influence?  
 
Despite their differences in nature, objectives, and intended uses, the indicators examined in 
our two cases demonstrated a rather surprising degree of similarity. Table 5 combines 
observations from both case studies. Indicator factors played a role secondary to the user and 
policy factors in explaining use and influence. Indicator use was enhanced when the 
repertoires embodied in the indicators matched user repertoires, whereas mismatch between 
the indicator and the dominant repertoires strengthened political influence. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Instrumental Conceptual Political 
Indicator factors 
Lack of timeliness, 
relevance; too high a 
level of spatial 
aggregation  
Framing effects 
from indicator 
development 
processes 
Poor-quality 
indicators (e.g fuel 
poverty) used 
politically  
User factors 
Low awareness of 
indicators among 
potential users; absence 
of ‘indicator culture’ 
Ambiguous 
perceptions of 
indicators: 
‘objective data’ vs. 
inferior, subjective 
information 
 
Political use seen as 
illegitimate 
‘politicking’ 
Policy factors 
UK adversarial and 
analytical policy culture 
Rapid changes in climate 
and energy policy 
objectives: indicators 
quickly obsolete 
Lack of sanctions for 
non-compliance 
Rising importance 
of energy security 
on the UK energy 
policy agenda 
UK energy sector’s 
“market 
fundamentalism” 
UK adversarial and 
analytic policy 
culture 
  Instrumental  Conceptual  Political 
Indicator factors  Unspecified  demand  for 
indicators  
Data quality of modest importance   Data  quality  of  modest 
importance:  lack  of  a  consistent 
indicator  framework;  political 
use of poor‐quality indicators 
User factors  Poor  identification  of 
target  groups  for 
indicators 
Low  awareness  of 
indicators among users 
Use  when  repertoires  match; 
influence  when  repertoires 
mismatch;  process  of  indicator 
development important 
Indicators  serve  to  confirm  existing 
frameworks  of  thought  when  their 
visions match the policy context 
Lack of trust in producers 
Indicators  are  potentially 
disruptive  and  transformative 
when  there  is  a  mismatch 
between  indicator  framings  and 
actor repertoires  
 
Policy factors  Changing  policy  agendas 
render  indicators 
obsolete and irrelevant  
Shifting policy priorities (rise of well‐
being  &  energy  security;  relative 
decline of SD and climate) 
Adversarial  and  analytical  policy 
style  fosters  strategic  and 
political use 
Strength  of  key  policy  ideas  in 
policy debates  as  a determinant 
of indicators’ political influence 
Table 5: Summary of findings from the two case studies. 
 
Mismatch Between Demand and Supply: Modest Instrumental Use and “Irrelevance” of 
Indicator Factors 
 
Especially indicator producers and specialists felt widespread frustration for the lack of 
significant instrumental use and influence of indicators. The lack of clear demand explained 
the weakness of instrumental influence in both cases, while especially SDI-Cs and headline 
indicators were poorly suited to instrumental use. 
The relative insignificance of the indicator factors, that is, the type and quality of the 
indicators, was exemplified, for instance, by the fact that the fuel poverty headline indicator 
in the ESI set and the Ecological Footprint were criticized for their poor quality, but were 
among the politically most influential of the examined indicators. Yet, key user groups 
considered high technical and scientific quality as a prerequisite for the acceptance and hence 
the use of indicators. 
 
“Process Use” and the Legitimacy of Indicator Producers 
 
SDI-Cs and ESIs differed with regard to their “process use”. Both were produced through 
highly expert-led processes, failing to generate influence beyond expert circles. However, the 
development of some indicators that were subsequently integrated into the ESI set (especially 
the fuel poverty and energy security indicators) significantly enhanced shared 
understandings. The SDI-Cs, in turn, were designed by groups of experts dedicated to 
shaping problem framings, conceptual frameworks, belief systems, and policy agendas. In 
doing so, these indicators likewise served political persuasion and advocacy for specific 
worldviews and political visions. 
The credibility of the indicators crucially depended on the reputation of their 
producer, as demonstrated by the distrust felt by the potential users of SDI-Cs toward the 
“midlevel actors” as indicator producers. In the UK case, legitimacy appeared significant to 
the extent that the erosion of trust in traditional scientific and technical expertise—a prime 
driver behind the evidence-based policy movement in the UK—prompted the relevant 
government officials to vigorously defend the independence and objectivity of the indicators. 
However, such persuasion may prove counterproductive: the more forcefully the government 
stresses the point, the more suspicious the public may grow concerning that very objectivity. 
 
Conceptual and Political Role(s) of Indicators: The Virtues of Justification and 
Controversy 
 
The use of indicators as “ammunition” in political debates was among the most visible of the 
various indirect pathways toward influence. Many of the SDI-Cs were designed for political 
advocacy, persuasion, justification, and critique, while the four “headline” indicators within 
the UK ESI set served a similar function. Together with the increasing abundance of 
indicators, this may help policy makers “cherry-pick” only those indicators that suit their own 
interests. However, some of the examples of indicators as “ammunition” illustrated the 
systematic downplaying of the normative dimensions of indicator work, as conflicts between 
worldviews were hidden in debates on methodology. Intended to shape and advocate 
worldviews and framings, both the SDI-Cs and the UK ESI headline indicators reflected the 
“norm-creation” perspective of Rametsteiner et al. (2011). And yet, the great emphasis that 
indicator experts placed on the need to isolate indicator production from any political 
“interference”—that is, political use of indicators—demonstrated the dominance of the 
“knowledge-production” perspective. Such an apolitical reading of indicators tends to limit 
the capacity of conflict and controversy to enhance the robustness of evidence 
(Chateauraynaud 2011). From this perspective, strategic and political use of indicators, 
manipulation, and even abuse of indicators constitute essential elements in the production of 
valid and reliable evidence. 
 
Conclusions 
 
As “boundary objects”, indicators constantly renegotiate and reposition themselves against 
policy contexts, repertoires of users and producers, and robustness of data. Indicator 
influence usually results from the interaction of indicator, user, and policy factors, rather than 
from any one of the three factors in isolation. Describing what indicators “do” and why, using 
terms such as “use”, “influence”, and “factors”, therefore does not allow one to identify 
overarching and general patterns that would explain the roles of indicators in various policy 
situations. Searching for generic “indicator pathways”, that is, systematic mechanisms that 
link use and influence with policy, indicator, and user factors, seems futile and may hide 
rather than illuminate the context-dependent dynamics at play. By implication, developing a 
prescriptive theory of indicator success, that is, a set of rules that would maximize the 
likelihood of policy uptake of indicators, would go against the lessons from research on the 
role of knowledge in policy making. 
However, the call for caution with regard to attempts at “engineering” the policy 
uptake of indicators does not warrant inaction. Instead, it should lead to constant negotiation 
among the policy actors in the spirit of “reflexive governance” (Beck 2006; Newig et al. 
2008), which entails the idea that “thinking and acting with respect to an object of steering 
also affects the subject and its ability to steer” (Voss and Kemp 2006: 4). Enhancing the 
policy uptake of indicators would imply “politics of policy indicators”, that is, doing not only 
politics with indicators, but explicitly addressing the politics inherent in the processes of 
indicator development, use, and influence.
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Such “politics of policy indicators” would also call into question the view, implicitly 
or explicitly endorsed by many of our informants, of reduction of ambiguity as an 
overarching objective for indicator work. In our case studies, indicators frequently failed as 
boundary objects, largely because of the mismatch between the different “repertoires”. 
However, this draws attention to another recurrent problem in indicator work, namely, the 
systematic tendency of policy actors to drive toward closure of policy problems and framings 
instead of opening up perspectives and policy options (Stirling 2006). If boundary objects 
draw their strength precisely from their sufficiently vague and ambiguous identity, the 
reduction of ambiguity seems misguided, as it would indeed drive toward the “closing down” 
of decisions and perspectives by providing unambiguous answers to inherently intractable 
and multifaceted problems, thereby confining indicators to one and a single disciplinary 
perspective or “social world”. Enhancing reflexivity would require opening up the debates 
and perspectives, highlighting the ambiguities, trade-offs, uncertainties, and conflicts 
between different perspectives and worldviews, and explicating rather than suppressing 
controversy as a distinct approach to “boundary work”, helping make explicit the usually 
taken-for-granted framings underpinning the indicators in question. 
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 Appendix A: The 28 Supporting Indicators of the UK ESI Set, as Presented in the First 
ESI Publication (DTI 2004) 
 
Low Carbon 
Economy 
 
1.1. Carbon dioxide emissions on an IPCC basis and measurement toward 
targets 
1.2. Final energy consumption by sector  
1.3. Carbon dioxide emissions per unit of GDP  
1.4. The energy ratio  
1.5. Share of fuels contributing to primary energy supply, fossil fuel 
dependency 
1.6. Proportion of electricity generated by renewables 
1.7. Utilization of CHP capacity 
1.8. Energy consumption (intensity)  
1.9. Energy intensities for road passengers and freight 
1.10. Specific energy consumption for households 
1.11. Average new CO2 emissions 
 
Reliability 
 
2.1. Electricity-generating capacity, average load factor, and simultaneous 
max load met for major power producers 
2.2. Gas capacity—maximum supply, maximum demand, and peak 1 in 
20 winter estimated demand  
2.3. Security and availability of electricity supply for the average 
customer 
2.4. Shares and diversity of fuels used for electricity generation  
2.5. Diversity of primary energy supply  
2.6. Diversity of oil imports  
2.7. Diversity of supply of primary fuels 
 
Competitiveness 
 
3.1. Changes in the productivity of the energy industries  
3.2. Percentage of gross value added accounted for by energy expenditure 
3.3. Fuel prices indices for the industrial sector  
3.4. Industrial gas prices within the EU and G7  
3.5. Industrial electricity prices in the EU and G7 
 
Fuel Poverty 
 
4.1. Total number of households in fuel poverty 
4.2. Trends in fuel poverty by severity 
4.3. SAP rating of households in the lowest 30 percent of income groups 
and average SAP rating for England 
4.4. Fuel prices indices for the domestic sector  
4.5. Fuel expenditure as a percentage of total expenditure by income 
group 
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Notes 
                                                      
1
 POINT received funding from the EU 7th Framework Programme on research under the grant 
agreement number 217207. For more information, see http://www.point-eufp7.info. 
2
 Examples of such perceptions of indicators as objective measurement tools are easy to find in the 
literature. For instance, the developers of the Environmental Sustainability Index (ESI) argue that 
 
                                                                                                                                                                        
“[t]he ESI moves us toward a more analytically rigorous and data driven approach to environmental 
decision making” (YaleNews 2002). 
3
 Influence is therefore close to the concept of portée (in English, “reach” or “extension”), which 
Chateauraynaud (2011) employs to describe the role, status, and the actual strength of an argument in 
a public controversy. 
4
 Weiss (1999, 471) defines enlightenment as “the percolation of new information, ideas and 
perspectives into the arenas in which decisions are made.” 
5
 Including in particular the conventional determinants of the quality of scientific information such as 
validity, reliability, specificity, and sensitivity to changes, but also more broadly aspects relating to the 
structuring of data, selection of the variables, weighting schemes, timeliness, robustness of the 
methodology, availability of accurate and appropriate data sources, methods of communication, 
construction, aggregation, and presentation of indicators. 
6
 The term “user” hence denotes in our framework the full range of actors involved in the production 
and use of indicators, and not only the intended users. 
7
 Twenty-four interviews were conducted within the direction of the European Environmental 
Agency, the Environmental Commission, DG officers (DG Environment, DG Research, DG 
Education, DG Internal market), and EUROSTAT experts. 
8
 Such as the Sustainable Development Indicators working group within EUROSTAT (Luxemburg, 
2009–2010); the OECD World Forum (Korea, 2009); the conference on Beyond GDP and Ecological 
Footprint (Brussels, 2009); and the EPIGOV (Environmental Policy Integration and Multi-Level 
Governance) final conference (Brussels, 2009). 
9
 EU’s growth strategy Europe 2020 (http://ec.europa.eu/europe2020/index_en.htm); EU Sustainable 
Development Strategy (http://ec.europa.eu/environment/eussd/); EU’s Beyond GDP initiative 
(http://ec.europa.eu/environment/beyond_gdp/background_en.html); indicators of the European 
Environmental Agency (http://www.eea.europa.eu/data-and-
maps/indicators#c5=&c7=all&c0=10&b_start=0); and the EU environment-related indicators 
(http://ec.europa.eu/environment/indicators/index_en.htm). 
10
 As one interviewee put it, these steps in the indicator production and diffusion chain would be a 
“matter of choice made by one particular actor at one particular moment in time for no particular 
reason.” 
11
 In the area of composite indicators, the “Stiglitz report” (Stiglitz et al. 2010) certainly contributed to 
this tendency. 
12
 Including the EU Sustainable Development Strategy, EU 2020, the Lisbon strategy, and the DG 
Environment indicators. 
13
 Until 2007 the Department for Trade and Industry (DTI); from 2007 to 2008 the Department for 
Business, Enterprise, and Regulatory Reform (BERR); and from October 2008, the Department of 
Energy and Climate Change (DECC). 
14
 About 115 individuals were contacted through e-mail, and a second and a third invitation were sent 
when necessary. The personal contacts of the Sussex Energy Group researchers were mobilized in 
order to maximize the likelihood of positive responses. Finally, only thirteen individuals participated 
in our workshop. 
15
 Perhaps the main way in which some actors (e.g., fuel poverty action groups) use the ESIs is as 
background material for their own specific indicators, for project proposals, presentations, and the 
like. However, the actors usually update and adapt the government indicators for their own needs, 
instead of using them unmodified. 
 
                                                                                                                                                                        
16
 For instance, according to some interviewees, indicators would not be needed in areas such as 
competitiveness, since price signals would provide sufficient information. 
17
 The existence of such a reputation was confirmed by a key energy sector advisor in an interview 
conducted as part of this study. 
18
 The government is therefore currently in a process of redefining the concept. 
19
 Similar calls have been made in the recent past on similar policy tools, for instance, toward a 
“politics of evaluative public policy instruments” (Turnpenny et al. 2009) and of evidence-based 
policy making in general (Pawson 2006). 
